Western New England University School of Law

Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of
Law
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2013

Formalism and State Secrets
Sudha Setty
Western New England University School of Law, ssetty@law.wne.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/facschol
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the National Security Commons
Recommended Citation
Sudha Setty, Formalism and State Secrets in Secrecy, National Security and the Vindication of Constitutional Law (David Cole,
Federico Fabbrini & Arianna Vedaschi, eds.).

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England University
School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

5.

Formalism and state secrets
SudhaSetty

INTRODUCTION*
The state secrets privilege has received a tremendous amount of scholarly
attention in the US in the last decade, initially prompted by the
administration of President George W. Bush seeking early dismissals of
lawsuits that dealt with allegations of serious constitutional and human
rights violations. 1 The administration's litigation posture was troubling but the judicial acceptance of these claims, largely based on the judiciary's own formalistic view of its own role in engaging the executive
branch on national security secrecy2 - allowed the executive branch to
make virtually unilateral secrecy determinations that shielded it from
civil suits.
In September 2009 the Obama administration created a new policy that
mandated a more tigorous internal administrative review prior to invoking the state secrets privilege. 3 In the years since the new policy took
effect, it appears as though this internal review process has resulted in
little difference with regard to the invocation of the privilege at the

* This chapter is drawn from a previous work: Sudha Setty, Judicial
Formalism and the State Secrets Privilege, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1629
(2012).
1
Press Release, Office of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Kennedy Introduces
State Secrets Protection Act (Jan. 22, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted),
available at 2008 WLNR 1256008; e.g., William G. Weaver and Robert M.
Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 PoL. Sci. Q. 85, 100 (2005)
(claiming that the Bush administration is using the state secrets privilege with
'offhanded abandon').
2
E.g., El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff'd, 479
F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing suit seeking damages for extraordinary
rendition and torture upon upholding the government's invocation of the state
secrets privilege).
3
See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., on Policies and
Procedures Governing Invocating of the State Secrets Privilege to Heads of Exec.
57
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pleadings stage in cases that allege torture and other human rights
abuses. 4
One high-profile case, that of Binyam Mohamed and other plaintiffs
claiming that they had been subject to extraordinary rendition, torture,
and prolonged detention, offers evidence of a disturbing trend of US
courts retreating to formalistic reasoning 5 to extend unwarranted deference to the executive branch in security-related6 contexts.? In this chapter,
I consider the state secrets privilege and place the formalist decisionmaking of the Mohamed court in juxtaposition with other nations'
jurisprudence - including the English courts that dealt with a separate

Dep'ts & Agencies (Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Holder Memorandum], (establishing layers of internal review regarding invocations of the state secrets
privilege).
4
See Sudha Setty, Litigating Secrets: Comparative Perspectives on the State
Secrets Privilege, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 201, 257-8 (2009) (identifying the
continuity between the Bush and Obama administrations in their approach to the
state secrets privilege).
5
I use judicial formalism to refer to a methodology that gives primacy to
narrow rule-following rather than consideration of the role of the courts to act in
a way that is infused with morality when necessary to preserve individual rights.
See Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 612-16
(1999) (describing one form of formalism as 'apurposive mle-following'). Justice
Antonin Scalia has supported use of a formal approach to maximize stability and
credibility in the Supreme Court's decision making, opining that a 'discretionconfening approach is ill suited ... to a legal system in which the supreme court
can review only an insignificant propo1iion of the decided cases'. See Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1178
(1989).
6
Cass Sunstein has offered three categories of judicial decision-making in
wartime: national security maximalism, in which courts defer broadly to executive branch claims of Article II authority; liberty maximalism, in which courts
maintain a peacetime approach to constitutional liberty questions; and minimalism, in which courts use a narrow approach to creating precedent to weigh
security and liberty interests. See Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004
SUP. CT. REV. 47, 50-52 (2004). I suggest that Mohamed and similar decisions
should be conceived of differently, reflecting a formal and narrow adherence to
procedures and rules as a means of enabling deference to executive claims and
avoiding meaningful engagement in underlying civil liberties concems.
7
E.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing suit seeking
damages for extraordinary rendition and torture upon a fmding that constitutional
and international law obligations did not apply); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 20 10) (dismissing suit seeking injunctive relief for the listing
of plaintiff's son on the US targeted killings list based on standing and political
question grounds).
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lawsuit brought by Mohamed there. This case exemplifies the US shift
away from the flexible, rule of law-oriented approach that courts in the
United Kingdom and Israel take, and toward the formalistic rigidity that
the Indian Supreme Court often employs in government secrecy cases. 8
Given the Obama administration's aggressive invocation of the state
secrets privilege and the judiciary's unwillingness to defend the ability of
individuals to litigate their basic human and civil rights, I conclude that
for meaningful change to occur, the United States Congress must
re-introduce state secrets reform legislation that infuses the litigation
process with procedural and substantive fairness, 9 and that courts must
step away from judicial formalism and instead take on the complex and
difficult task of providing a venue for government accountability.

1. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND THE STATE
SECRETS PRIVILEGE
In his prefatory language to the Obama administration's 2009 state
secrets policy, Attorney General Eric Holder emphasizes that the policy's
goals include 'provid[ing] greater accountability and reliability in the
invocation of the state secrets privilege in litigation ... [and] strengthen[ing] public confidence that the U.S. government will invoke the privilege
in comt only when genuine and significant harm to national defense or
foreign relations is at stake and only to the extent necessary to safeguard
those interests' . 10 The policy also includes important limitations such as a
prohibition against using the privilege to conceal violations of the law or
prevent embanassment to the government. 11 Unfortunately, the promise
8

These four nations - the United States, England, Israel and India - are
useful comparators because of their shared common law traditions and the shared
roots of evidentiary privileges such as the state secrets privilege in English law
and policy.
9
'Congress's reform attempts, albeit unsuccessful, have attempted to
improve procedural and substantive justice for plaintiffs. See, e.g., 154 CONG.
REC. S198-201 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kennedy on the State
Secrets Protection Act).
10
Holder Memorandum, supra note 3, at 1.
11
Holder Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2. The rest of the policy establishes
the layers of review with the Department of Justice with regard to satisfying the
procedural requirements for invoking and defending the privilege. These procedural requirements are first laid out in the seminal US state secrets case of United
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-8, 10-11 (1953). For an in-depth account of
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of these reforms has not yet been fulfilled, as the case of Binyam
Mohamed exemplifies.
In Mohamed, the Northern District of California dismissed a suit
brought by five detainees against a Boeing subsidiary allegedly involved
in the transportation of the detainees for government-directed rendition
and torture. 12 Binyam Mohamed, a British resident, claimed that he
traveled to Afghanistan in 2001 to escape a lifestyle that led to drug
addiction in England. 13 US authorities alleged that Mohamed trained with
the Taliban in Afghanistan to prepare for an attack within the US.
Mohamed was arrested in Pakistan in 2002 and claims he was detained
and tortured in various locations under US control until February 2009,
when he was released without charge. 14 Mohamed and similarly situated
plaintiffs filed suit in 2007 against Jeppesen Dataplan, the Boeing
subsidiary that operated detainee transport airplanes to and from detention centers. 15
In granting the govemment's motion to dismiss, the district court used
the same reasoning that other US courts dealing with the privilege have
relied upon, 16 primarily the need to dismiss the suit because the subject
matter at issue- the govemment's extraordinary rendition program- was
itself a state secret that could jeopardize national security interests if
revealed. 17 A Ninth Circuit panel reversed, rejecting the government's
claims that the suit needed to be dismissed outright based on its subject
matter. 18 The administration appealed to the Ninth Circuit to hear the
case en bane, where it prevailed in having Mohamed's suit dismissed.

the Reynolds case, see LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY:
UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE (2006).
12
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1130 (N.D.
Cal. 2008).
13
Profile: Binyam Mohamed, BBC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2009), http://
news. bbc.co. uk/2/hi/7870387 .stm.
14
Id. Mohamed alleges that he was beaten, scalded, and suffered cuts on his
genit11ls with a scalpel by his captors.
15
Amended Complaint at 1-6, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563
F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-2798).
16
E.g., El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff'd,
479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing based on the state secrets privilege a
suit in which plaintiff alleged extraordinary rendition and torture).
17
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1134-36
(N.D. Cal. 2008).
18
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 997, 1009 (9th Cir.
2009).
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2. FORMALISM IN JEPPESEN
The Ninth Circuit en bane dismissed the plaintiffs' suit in a formalistic
opinion that failed to acknowledge the reality of the gross human rights
abuses that plaintiffs suffered. The majority began its evaluation of the
government's invocation of the privilege by finding that the procedural
requirements were met and that the information is privileged. 19 The court
then reasoned that it is obligated to dismiss a suit if it appeared that
privileged information would be necessary to litigate the case. 20 The
majority found that even if plaintiffs were able to prove their case relying
solely on publicly available evidence, dismissal of the suit was still
warranted because Jeppesen Dataplan would have found it difficult to
mount a defense without implicating privileged material.2 1 It is particularly ironic that the majority, while claiming to have struggled with the
tension between human rights and security concerns, ultimately retreated
to rigid and formalist reasoning that turned on its concern that a company
allegedly complicit in the torture of innocent civilians is able to
adequately defend itself in a civil matter. 22
The majority opinion abdicated its structural responsibility to uphold
the rule of law and check govemment abuse, instead offering only hollow
platitudes and unlikely avenues for redress: at one point the court
conjectures that the executive branch may decide someday to compensate
the victims of the extraordinary rendition program, akin to the compensation for the rendition and internment of individuals of Japanese descent
during World War Il.2 3 At other points, the court bizanely shifted
responsibility to Congress to provide redress to plaintiffs, noting that
19

Id. at 1080, 1085-6 (relying on the test articulated in United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953)).
20
Id. at 1083.
21
Id. at 1089-90.
22
The veracity of the plaintiffs' claims about Jeppesen Dataplan's complicity
in the torture is not factored into the majority opinion, a point raised by the
dissent. See id. at 1095 n 5 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (noting that former
Jeppesen employees understood that their extraordinary rendition flights resulted
in the torture of detainees).
23
Id. at 1091. It is remarkable that the majority considered the reparations
awarded to Japanese internees during World War II as a potentially appropl'iate
model of compensation. Those reparations came decades after the harm to the
internees, and only after a national soul-searching as to how such poor national
security policy was validated by all branches of government and the public.
Further, hearkening back to the internment evokes comparisons to the deferential
fonnalism of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which most
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Congress has the power to investigate government abuses, could enact
private bills to compensate the plaintiffs or take up state secrets reform. 24
The dissent by Judge Hawkins included a critique of the narrowness of
the majority opinion, noting the veracity of Mohamed's claims of
Jeppesen Dataplan's role in rendition and torture, and that the majority's
failure to give weight to these claims undermines an appropriate analysis.25 Judge Hawkins observed that the majority 'disregard[ed] the
concept of checks and balances' and abdicated its responsibility by
suggesting that the executive or Congress should act to provide compensation, characterizing the majority's suggestion regarding reparations as
'elevat[ing] the impractical to the point of absurdity' and noting the need
to preserve an avenue for the tortured plaintiffs to seek redress in the
courts if possible. 26

3. FORMALISM IN THE COMPARATIVE CONTEXT
The Supreme Court established the standard for evaluating a claim of the
state secrets privilege in thtb 1950s, drawing from English precedent
during World War II. English public interest immunity, used akin to the
state secrets privilege, evolved in a different direction than that of the
U.S. since that time; this dynamic is illustrated clearly in the contemporaneous treatment of Binyam Mohamed's lawsuit in the English courts.
To further contextualize the analysis of judicial formalism in the application of the privilege, I briefly consider how Israel and India deal with
questions of state secrecy during litigation. 27

3.1 England
English courts generally afford high levels of deference to government
officials claiming public interest immunity,2 8 although the 2009 and 2010
modern commentators view as a profound failure of the judiciaty to uphold the
rule of law and curb abuses by the national security state.
24
Id. at 1091-92.
25
Id. at 1095-96.
26
Id. at 1101.
27
India and Israel are useful comparators as functioning democracies with
constitutionally mandated separation of powers and serious ongoing national
security threats, and, like the US in the context of the state secrets privilege,
derive some legal processes from the United Kingdom.
28
See Air Canada v. Sec'y of State for Trade [1983] 2 AC 394 at 395 (Eng.)
(stating that when a government official has proffered a good faith affidavit as to
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decisions in the case of Binyam Mohamed illustrate a potential shift. The
backdrop of the English litigation in Mohamed relates to proceedings in
the US. In May 2008, the US charged Mohamed under the Military
Commissions Act29 with conspiracy to commit terrorism, 30 relying on
confessions which Mohamed alleged were elicited under the threat of
torture. 31 Mohamed began proceedings in English courts seeking release
of evidence in the possession of the British government that the US had
compiled against Mohamed. In August 2008, a court ruled in Mohamed's
favor,3 2 but redacted a summary of intelligence gleaned from US
intelligence sources after the Foreign Secretary issued a public interest
immunity certificate claiming that state secrets were at issue. 33
The Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division reconsidered in
early 2009 whether the public interest immunity certificate issued by the
Foreign Secretary was compelling. 34 The public interest immunity certificate asserted that the summary report must remain undisclosed because
the US government had threatened to 're-evaluate its intelligence sharing
relationship with the United Kingdom' and possibly withhold vital
national security information from the United Kingdom should the
summary be disclosed to Mohamed's attorneys. 35
The English court laid out the test for balancing the public interest in
national security and the public interest in 'open justice, the rule of law

the need for the public interest immunity to apply, the court should give absolute
deference).
29
10 u.s.c. §§ 948-50 (2006).
30
This proceeding was later dropped, as the convening judge determined the
prosecution could not proceed without the use of evidence obtained through
torture. See William Glaberson, U.S. Drops Charges for 5 Guantanamo Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/washington/
22gitmo.html?adxnnl=l&adxnnlx=1328130327-WTFk:Fvw3ue0Rn9QlvAuLHQ.
31
Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2008]
EWHC (Admin) 2048, [38]-[47] (Eng.).
32
Id. at [105].
33
Id. at [150]-[160].
34
The court noted that the information in question was '7 very shmt
paragraphs amounting to about 25 lines' of text which summarized reports by the
US govemment to British intelligence services on the treatment of Mohamed
during his detention in Pakistan. See Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign &
Commonwealth Affairs, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [14] (Eng.).
35
Id. at [62]. See Glenn Greenwald, Obama Administration Threatens Britain
to Keep Torture Evidence Concealed, SALON.COM (May 12, 2009), www.salon.
com/2009/05/12/obama_1 01.
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and democratic accountability' .36 The test involved balancing the public
interest in disclosure of the information and the possibility of serious
harm to a public interest such as national security if disclosure is made,
and determining whether national security interests can be protected by
means other than nondisclosure. 3 7
Considering factors in support of disclosing the information, the court
noted the need to uphold the rule of law,3 8 comport with international and
supranational standards,3 9 ensure that allegations of serious criminality
are not inappropriately dismissed, 40 maintain accountability over the
government, 41 and protect the public and media interest in disclosure
of government activities. 42 The court also appeared surprised that the
U.S. government was apparently intetfering in a matter of the rule of law
and government accountability in another country. 43 Nonetheless, the
court relied on its long-standing precedent of deference to the executive
branch in matters of national security44 and upheld the Foreign Secretary's issuance of the public interest immunity certificate. 45
However, in October 2009 the court reversed its previous decision to
withhold the information regarding Mohamed's treatment. 46 The court
36

Mohamed, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [18] (Eng.) (noting that this case
revolved around a question of the rule of law, not around the rights of an
individual litigant).
37
Id. at [34] (citing Regina v. H, [2004] 2 AC 134 (HL) [36(3)] (Eng.)).
38
Mohamed, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [18]-[19] (Eng.).
39
See Mohamed, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152, [20]-[21], [26], [30], [101][105].
40
Id. at [26(iv)], [26(ix)].
41
Id. at [32].
42
Id. at [37] ('Where there is no publicity there is no justice ... There is no
greater danger of usurpation than that which proceeds little by little, under cover
of mles of procedure, and at the instance of judges themselves' (quoting Scott v.
Scott, [1913] AC 417 (HL) 477 (Lord Shaw of Dunfermline) (appeal taken from
EWCA (Civ) (UK)).
43
Id. at [69].
44
See id. at [63]-[67]. However, the court noted that such deference needed
to be limited to instances of genuine national security, and not cases in which 'it
appears that while disclosure of the material may cause embarrassment or arouse
criticism, it will not damage any security or intelligence interest'. Id. at [66]
(quoting R. v. Shayler, [2003] AC 247 (HL) 272 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill)
(appeal taken from EWCA (Crim) (UK)).
45
Id. at [79].
46
Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2009]
EWHC (Admin) 2653, [7] (Eng.) (noting that reopening of a case should be done
in 'exceptional circumstances' if necessary in the 'interests of justice').
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reasoned that there was an extremely low likelihood that the Obama
administration would actually withhold intelligence from the United
Kingdom, 47 and noted that 'a vital public interest requires, for reasons of
democratic accountability and the rule of law in the United Kingdom,
that a summary of the most important evidence relating to the involvement of the British security services in wrongdoing be placed in the
public domain in the United Kingdom' .48
The October 2009 decision ultimately rejected formalistic reasoning in
favor of maintaining the rule of law, open justice and the possibility of
public accountability. In February 2010, the Court of Appeal upheld the
divisional court's decision, noting the veracity of Mohamed's claims of
torture. 49 Specifically, the appellate decision looked to dicta in the US
habeas corpus matter of Mohammed v. Obama. 50 In that case, Judge
Kessler weighed the habeas corpus petition of detainee Farhi Saeed bin
Mohammed and considered evidence proffered by the government that
Binyam Mohamed, while in detention at Guantanamo Bay, told the
government that bin Mohammed had trained with him at an al-Qaeda
base. 51 Judge Kessler described the harrowing detention and torture of
Binyam Mohamed while in US custody that rendered his testimony
regarding bin Mohammed unreliable and inadmissible. 52 She further
noted that '[t]he Government does not challenge or deny the accuracy of
Binyam Mohamed's story of brutal treatment' .53
The English Court of Appeal used this revelation as one basis for
upholding the order for the UK government to disclose information

47
Id. at [39], [49], [69vi], [104]. The court noted that the objections made by
the Obama administl'ation to disclosing the information in question were not as
strong as the threats made by the Bush administration.
48
ld. at [105].
49
Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2010]
EWCA (Civ) 158, [2011] QB 218 (Eng.). See Adam Tomkins, National Security
and the Due Process of Law, 64 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 215, 229 (2011)
(noting that allegations of horrific torture weighed significantly in the comi's
decision-making).
50
Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009). This citation
refers to the de-classified opinion that was made publicly available on December
16, 2009. The original version of the opinion, dated November 19, 2009, is cited
at Mohammed v. Obama, 689 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2009).
51
Mohamed, 704 F. Supp 2d. at 2, 18-19.
52
Id. at 20-23, 29.
53
Id. at 24.
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regarding Mohamed's mistreatment. 54 This willingness of the English
Court of Appeal to engage in a realist analysis serves as a sharp contrast
to the Ninth Circuit en bane decision in Mohamed, where the majority
does not appear to concern itself with evidence of the veracity of
Mohamed's claims and instead limits itself to an overly formalistic
interpretation of the state secrets privilege. 55
3.2 Israel

Israeli courts, like their English counterparts, offer an example of how
the courts balance imperatives of security with the rule of law when they
refuse to accept a narrow interpretation of their own role. Courts, akin to
the English reasoning in the Mohamed case, use a flexible, realist
approach to analyzing these questions, giving significant weight to
plaintiffs' allegations of human rights violations. In Israel almost any
complaint against the executive branch is considered justiciable. 56
Although justiciability is no guarantee of ultimate success in litigation
against the government, the institutionalization of hearing such cases
reflects, at its best, a judicial willingness of the courts to engage in
critical thinking about government claims regarding nfttional security.
In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, 57 plaintiffs
challenged the preventative strikes undertaken by the Israeli military in
response to alleged terrorist attacks based on the ensuing loss of civilian
life and Israel's intemational law obligations. As an initial matter, the
court considered a challenge by the government that the suit was not
justiciable based on national security concerns. 58 The Israeli Supreme
54

Mohamed v. Sec'y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
[2010] EWCA (Civ) 65 [138], [2011] QB 218 (Eng.).
55 1n fact, the only reference to Judge Kessler's decision comes in a footnote
referencing the Mohammed case, in which the court notes that Binyam Mohamed's allegations have been discussed elsewhere. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen
Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1074 n.l (9th Cir. 2010).
56 Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme
Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REv. 16, 153 (2002) ('Our Supreme Court
- which in Israel serves as the court of first instance for complaints against the
executive branch - opens its doors to anyone with a complaint about the
activities of a public authority.').
57
HCJ 769/02 Public Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel [2005] (Isr.),
available at http://elyon 1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007I A34/02007690.a34.
pdf.
58
Id. at 5 ~ 9 (arguing against justiciability, the government cites Israeli High
Court of Justice precedent, HCJ 5872/01 Barakeh v. Prime Minister 56(3)
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Court applied a four-pronged test to determine justiciability, reasoning
that a case involving the impingement of human rights is always
justiciable;59 that a case in which the central issue is one of political or
military policy and not a legal dispute is not justiciable; 60 that an issue
that has already been decided by international courts and tribunals to
which Israel is a signatory must be justiciable in Israel's domestic courts;
and that judicial review is most appropriate in an ex post situation. 61
In this case, the Israeli Supreme Court found that the claims were
clearly justiciable. 62 Ultimately, the Israeli Supreme Court concluded that
the targeted killings at issue were not per se illegal, but that they must be
evaluated on an individual basis. 63 Although the holding in Public
Committee Against Torture raises important and conceming questions as
to the substantive justice of these decisions, a baseline structural benefit
exists in having access to courts for grievances involving allegations of
human rights violations.

3.3 India
Whereas England and Israel illustrate the ability of courts to utilize a rule
of law analysis, India represents a hard line of formalism that the US is at
risk of veering toward. Indian courts have historically granted the utmost
deference to the executive branch as to when national security policy
should be disclosed. 64 When cases raise issues of individual rights being
[2002], for the proposition that 'the choice of means of war employed by [the
government] in order to prevent murderous terrorist attacks before they happen,
is not among the subjects in which this Court will see fit to intervene').
59
HCJ 769/02 Public Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel 34-35 '][50
[2005] (Isr.), available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il!files_eng/02/690/007/A34/
02007690.a34.pdf (citing HCJ 606/78 Oyeb v. Minister of Def. 33(2) Isr SC 113,
124 (Isr.)).
60
Id. at 35 §51 (citing HCJ 4481/91 Bargil v. Israel 37(4) Isr SC 210, 218
[1993] (Isr.)).
61
Id. at 36 §§ 53-4.
62
Id. at 1-2 §§1-3.
63
Id at 41-2 § 63. This decision is particularly notable given the recent
decision dismissing a suit challenging the U.S. targeted killing program. See
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing, based on
standing grounds, the suit of Nasser al-Aulaqi to enjoin the US government from
keeping his son, US citizen Anwar al-Aulaqi, on its targeted killing list).
64
E.g., State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 SC 865 (India)
(carving out national security as the area in which the Prime Minister can
unilaterally decide what information to disclose); see Mrinal Satish and Aparna
Chandra, Of Maternal State and Minimalist Judiciaty: The Indian Supreme
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compromised by government secrecy, courts purport to undertake a
balancing test to determine whether the public interest or individual
rights at stake should override executive secrecy; however, government
claims regarding the necessity of secrecy consistently prevail. 65 Deference to executive branch decision-making is deep-rooted in national
security-related cases, 66 and is consistent with India's history of granting
the executive branch sole power to determine whether to disclose
information in any number of contexts, including enforcement of its
Official Secrets Act, a legacy of British colonial rule in India. 67
In Dinesh Trivedi v. Union of India, 68 the Indian Supreme Court
considered whether to order the publication of background documents
underlying a commissioned report on government corruption over which
the government had claimed secrecy. Members of Parliament, including
petitioner Dinesh Trivedi, alleged that the Home Minister refused disclosure to avoid government embarrassment. 69 The Indian Supreme Court
began with the need for transparency, noting that 'Sunlight is the best
Court's Approach to Terror-Related Adjudication, 21 NAT'L L. ScH. INDIA REV.
51, 65 (2009) (describing the history of Indian courts deferring to executive
decisions regarding security matters).
65
E.g., People's Union for Civil Liberties & Am. v. Union of India & Ors.,
(2004) 2 S.C.C. 476 (India) (upholding denial of request for disclosure of
information).
66
This deference has been consistent, despite the adoption of right to
information legislation in recent years and judicial statements about the importance of government transparency. Freedom of Information Act, No. 5 of 2003;
INDIA CODE (2009), available at http://indiacode.nic.in; e.g,, S.P. Gupta v.
President of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 234, § 66 (India) ('The concept of an open
government is the direct emanation from the right to know which seems to be
implicit in the right of free speech and expression guaranteed under Article
19(l)(a) [of the Indian Constitution]. Therefore, disclosure of information in
regard to the functioning of Gove1nment must be the rnle and secrecy an
exception justified only where the strictest requirement of public interest so
demands.').
67
India operfltes under the edicts of the Official Secrets Act of 1923 (OSA),
enforced in India by the British colonial government. Under the OSA, any
disclosure of information - intentional or inadvertent - likely to affect the
sovereignty, integrity or security of India is punishable by imprisonment for up to
fourteen years.
68
Dinesh Trivedi v. Union of India, (1997) 4 S.C.C. 306 (India). The Court
in Trivedi relies heavily on the balancing test articulated in S.P. Gupta, supra
note 65, to find that government secrecy claims ought to be upheld despite rule
of law concems.
69
Trivedi, 4 S.C.C. 306, §§6, 8.
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disinfectant. But it is equally important to be alive to the dangers that lie
ahead.' 70 The Indian Supreme Court accepted with little question the
government's claim and hypothesized that the public furor toward
individuals named in the report - should it be published in full - could
lead to harassment and violence. Based on its own speculative concerns
that appear grounded in historical deference to executive decisionmaking,71 the court upheld government secrecy claims. 72 Similar reasoning has been used in other secrecy matters,7 3 bolstered by claims of
consistency with English public interest immunity jurisp1'udence.74 The
level of deference offered by the Indian Supreme Court is higher than
that of any of the other nations considered here, but is seemingly more
consistent with the recent state secrets cases in the US than that of the
English courts in the Mohamed litigation.7 5 The Indian Supreme Court,
consistent with its security-related jurisprudence, has consistently
reverted to a formalistic analysis that offers a rhetorical nod to the rule of
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Id. § 19.
See SHYLASHRI SHANKAR, SCALING JUSTICE: INDIA'S SUPREME COURT,
ANTI-TERROR LAWS, AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 61-71, 90-91 (2009) (arguing that
whereas social rights is considered an area in which the judiciary is expected to
take an active role, security and secrecy are areas in which the constitutional
framers and Parliament have purposefully curtailed the judiciary's ability to curb
executive power),
72
Id. §§ 16-20.
73 E.g., People's Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.,
(2004) 2 S.C.C. 476 (India). The Court in this case upheld the govemment's
secrecy claim over a report on nuclear reactors, reasoning that secrecy was
sometimes necessary because '[i]f every action taken by the political or executive
functionary is transformed into a public controversy and made subject to an
enquiry to soothe popular sentiments, it will undoubtedly have a chilling effect
on the independence of the decision-maker'. See the Right of Information section
of the People's Union opinion, id.
74
See the Criteria for Determining the Question of Privilege section of the
People's Union opinion, id. (citing Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C.
865, which held that 'the foundation of the law behind Sections 123 and 162 of
the Evidence Act is the same as in English law').
75
There is no indication that the adoption of a Right to Infmmation statute in
2005 has substantially affected the reasoning of the courts with regard to
security-related secrecy, particularly since the statute contains a carve-out for
national security matters. See The Right to Information Act, No. 22 of 2005,
INDIA CODE (2009 ), available at http://indiacode.nic.in.
71
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Secrecy, national security and the vindication of constitutional law

law and individual rights, but no avenue of relief for those who seek to
chip away at government secrecy.7 6

CONCLUSION
In the US, the state secrets cases illustrate what may be becoming the
new normal in security-related jurisprudence: formalistic reasoning that
allows the court to bow out of its counter-majoritarian role of protecting
individual rights and justice. Certainly the approach taken by India and
the US is not the only viable one - England and Israel are evidence of
that. The Mohamed case illustrates that England's current application of
the state secrets privilege - however historically deferential - reflects at
least in some cases the prioritization of various rule of law principles by
the English courts, including the need for open justice, government
accountability, and the opportunity for redress by individual litigants. The
flexible approach used by the English court to determine that secrecy
ought not prevail in the Mohamed case is reassuring to those concemed
with rights protection. Yet the larger specter of the US exerting pressure
regarding the state secrets privilege serves as a waming that even though
the US was not successful with regard to applying pressure on England,7 7
US soft power may successfully pressure courts in nations where courts
would otherwise apply a narrower privilege.
Such a dynamic makes it all the more important that structural reform
occur. Passage of strong state secrets reform legislation should become a
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See Satish and Chandra, supra note 64, at 63 (critiquing the Indian
Supreme Court's terrorism jurispmdence for focusing on procedural and technical questions and abdicating its role as a prot~ctor of fundamental rights).
77
The US government's displeasure at the English treatment of Binyam
Mohamed's case motivated the British government to propose the stripping of
judicial review over similar cases in which sensitive information may be
disclosed. See SECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICE, JUSTICE AND SECURITY GREEN
PAPER, 2011, Cm. 8194, § 2.91 (UK), available at www.statewatch.org/news/
2011/oct/uk-justice-and-security-green-paper.pdf. The Green Paper notes that
such measures are necessary because '[s]ince Binyam Mohamed, the Government
and its foreign government patiners have less confidence than before that the
courts will accept the view of Ministers on the harm to national security that
would result from disclosure'. Id. § 1.43; cf. United Kingdom House of Lords,
Joint Committee on Human Rights, Twenty-Fourth Report, Justice and Security
Green Paper, at §§ 99-103 (Mar. 27, 2012) (emphasizing the importance of
courts in weighing government claims of the need for secrecy).
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priority, 78 and courts should resist being cowed by assertions that judicial
involvement in security matters is unwarranted or undermines the safety
of the nation. 79 Although genuine access to the courts is no guarantee of
substantive justice, substantive justice is unlikely to be achieved if the
judiciary continues to retreat behind a wall of formalism.
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Arguments that high levels of deference are unwarranted continue to grow.
E.g., See Aziz Rana, Who Decides on Security? 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1417, 1424,
1445-46 (2012); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Secrecy and Democracy: Who Controls
Infmmation in the National Security State? (NYU Sch. of Law, Pub. Law
Research Paper No. 10-53), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l661964.
79
Such assertions are sometimes offered by the judiciaty itself. E.g.,
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 802 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(critiquing the level of judicial involvement in detention decisions endorsed by
the Court and noting that, '[a]ll that today's opinion has done is shift responsibility for those sensitive foreign policy and national security decisions from the
elected branches to the Federal Judiciary').

